

In a sense, vision is rather superficial, since when we look around, almost always what we see is just the surfaces of opaque things of the world and little more. Another kind of surface is that of a cloud, defined by the boundary between air with many drops of water (a vapor) reflecting light, and air with few drops. The exception is a mirage, in which air layers reflect light.

The surface is polarized, that is, different on its two sides, and usually only the solid or liquid reflects light, not the boundary of the air. The surface is the boundary of the solid or liquid, which reflects light to the observer’s vantage point. For vision, the volumes are usually filled by a solid or liquid and air. The change from one volume to the other occurs at the surface. Basically, a surface is two volumes meeting. About continuous surfaces, Gauss ( 1825/1827) wrote: “A curved surface is said to possess continuous curvature at one of its points A, if the directions of all the straight lines drawn from A to points of the surface at an infinitely small distance from A are deflected infinitely little from one and the same plane passing through A” (point 3, p. Physically, a real surface is a continuous, polarized plane. We begin our introduction to the experience of surface perception with a definition of a surface, a list of the shapes of surfaces, and their possible and impossible combinations. Further, we will admit here that the crosstalk behind the twofold experiences given by representational artwork is the source of illusions. We will acknowledge here that, in practice, our experience of highly-foreshortened real surfaces has niggling errors. However, we confess, our principled defense of realism is highly circumscribed. Far afield, the same goes even for the Moon and Mars-anywhere we are not immersed in fog! The experience we get from representational pictures is based on this abundant information for surfaces. We show that there is plenty of information around us in the natural world for surfaces and the cornucopia allows us to experience our earthly environment accurately. Surfaces and perspective are the key to an argument for realism. Here, we argue linear perspective, characterized by foreshortening, allows us to experience real surfaces (in touch as well as in vision), and representational pictures use perspective to depict surfaces with great fidelity. To understand the double experience, we need to understand perception of surfaces, both the real ones and the represented ones. They give us twofold experiences-two things simultaneously in one space: firstly, surfaces standing before us, and, secondly, represented surfaces (Wollheim 2003). Often, artworks are representational pictures, surfaces that we experience as showing other surfaces. Surfaces allow control of action even for creatures that fly in 3D without touching surfaces during flight, such as bats and birds. The theory of surface perception shows why pictures taken on the Moon or Mars are as intelligible as terrestrial pictures. The importance of surface perception is its breadth of application. Features on the picture surface cannot be seen correctly. The theory is applied to outline drawing and to the fact that pictures provide two surfaces (the real surface of the picture and the depicted surface). Sudden changes in density without changes in the ratio indicate a drop-off. Sudden changes in the ratio indicate changes in slant. Decrease it and the surrounds are a bowl. Flat surfaces such as the ground have a linear to quadratic ratio.

Optical information for the shapes of surfaces is given by the ratio of azimuth to elevation. To rectify this omission, a theory of surfaces is presented here, suggesting that surface perception occurs in all 8 of vision’s modes. Remarkably, almost no contemporary theory of perception uses the term. However, it was first offered as a serious concept in perception theory by Alhazen in his Book of Optics (1039). But what is a theory of perception of surfaces? Surface perception was first mentioned in experimental psychology by Metzger in Ganzfeld experiments in the 1930s.
